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OVERVIEW

This article discusses how international human rights and humanitarian
law can be applied to the current armed conflict in Colombia and specifically
considers whether human rights violators currently operating there with
almost total impunity can be effectively prosecuted and punished under
international law. Since the ongoing violations of the human rights of
Colombian citizens have been implicitly excused by a government that is
increasingly ineffective in dealing with the political chaos that has caused
them, an international solution may be the best available alternative. By
ceding or losing control of large portions of its national territory to guerrilla
forces, by allowing paramilitary groups to act as vigilantes or as unofficial
units of the military, and by looking the other way while its own military
abuses the rights of its citizens, the Colombian government has demonstrated
that it is unable or unwilling to address a problem that grows worse as the
conflict accelerates.
Part 11 of this article briefly analyzes the origins of the current conflict
within the context of Colombia's violent political history. Part Il identifies
the organizations that are principally responsible for Violating human rights
in Colombia today. Part IV identifies several of the major human rights
abuses taking place in Colombia that rise to the level of violating both
international human rights and humanitarian law. Part V discusses
Colombia's contradictory approach to human rights issues, including an
exemplary adherence to international treaties and an espoused commitment
to human rights in its domestic laws, coupled with a reputation as having the
worst human rights record in the world. Part VI examines the international
legal regimes that can be used to hold human rights violators in Colombia
liable for their actions, and identifies which fall short and which may be
effective in bringing perpetrators to justice. Part VII concludes with a
discussion of why the asserted solution is justified in this case.
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I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

The Current Conflict in Colombia

Colombia is a country where impunity reigns.' In the face of a
protracted period of violence and insecurity, the government is increasingly
ineffective and unresponsive to the needs of its citizens.2 The judiciary is
virtually powerless as a result of decades of death threats and payoffs from
drug traffickers, and today less than three percent of crimes are successfully
prosecuted. The impact of this judicial vacuum exacerbates an already
weakened executive branch.
Colombia's former president was widely
believed to have financed his presidential campaign with drug money,
revealing to the world the extent to which drug cartels have infiltrated and
compromised the government. 5 The current president, Andres Pastrana,
witnessed further deterioration of the situation due to the government's
inability to effectively control guerrilla groups, paramilitary groups, and to6
some extent its own military, despite a concerted effort to negotiate peace.
Pastrana's government is seen as "weak and increasingly unpopular. ' 7 His
brainchild solution, Plan Colombia, consisting largely of an infusion of

1.
U.S. DEP'TOFSTATE, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
(Colombia), Feb. 25,2000, at http:llwww.state.gov./www/global/human-ights1999-hrpreport/ colombia.html [hereinafter 1999 Colombia CountryReports].

2.

Id.

3.

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Colombia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for

1998, Feb. 26, 1999, at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rightsl1998-hrp-reportl
colombia.html [hereinafter 1998 Colombia CountryReport]; see also 1999 Colombia Country
Reports, supra note 1 (reporting that "63 percent of crimes go unreported, and that 40 percent
of all reported crimes go unpunished").
4.
1998 ColombiaCountry Report, supranote 3.
5.
Pedro Ruz Gutierrez, Bullets, Bloodshed and Ballots: For Generations Violence
Has Defined Colombia's Turbulent Political History, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Fla.), Oct. 31,
1999, at Al; see also Jorge L. Esquirol, Can InternationalLaw Help? An Analysis of the
Colombian Peace Process, 16 CONN. J.INT'L L. 23, 31 (2000).
6.
Human Rights in Colombia: 'Situation is Indeed Bleak,' BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
31, 2000, at D2 [hereinafter Human Rights in Colombia] (Interview with Mary Robinson, the

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights).
7.
Tim Golden, Now, State of Siege, Colombian Style, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1999, at
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military aid from the United States, has the potential to escalate hostilities
and make a bad situation worse. 8
As a result, governmental legitimacy has been severely eroded and
violence has become a way of life. 9 Colombian citizens are constantly
subjected to rampant political and criminal upheaval perpetrated by
guerrillas, paramilitary groups, and drug traffickers, as well as by the
Colombian military and national police.10 Violence has divided the country,
killed thousands, and displaced even more."' Over the past ten years, more
than 35,000 lives have been lost in this continuing conflict, and more than
This situation has led to
one million civilians have been displaced.
reputation as having the worst human rights record in the world
Colombia's
13

today.
B.

Colombia's Violent History

Violence in Colombia is nothing new. More than 500,000 Colombians
have died as a result of political violence during the past 100 years.' 4 For at
least the past fifty years, the country has been mired in a protracted state of5
political violence, which has caused a steady decline in national security.1
This violent political history provided fertile ground for the rise to power
and illicit political dominance of the drug cartels, which capitalized on
8.

Andrew Miller, U.S. Military Support for Plan Colombia: Adding Fuel to the

Fire, 8 HuM. RIGHTS BRIE 8 (2000). In 2000, the United States approved a $1.319 billion aid
package to assist in the implementation of Plan Colombia, a $7.5 billion Colombian national
recovery program designed to address problems of economic recovery, strengthen state
institutions, strengthen national security and counter-narcotics operations, and kick start the
peace process. Id. at 10. The majority of the United States aid package was earmarked for
military operations. Id. The aid was originally tied to Colombian compliance with five
human rights conditions but subject to waiver. In August 2000, all but one condition was
waived and $1 billion dollars was distributed. Id.
9.

See Human Rights in Colombia, supra note 6.

10.

Julia Manglano, The Pervasive Immunity that Surrounds Human Rights

Violations Committed by Colombia's Military, 3 DEPAUL DiG. INT'L L. 45, 47 (1997); see also
1999 Columbia Country Reports, supra note 1; Human Rights in Colombia, supra note 6.
11. Sibylla Brodzinsky, Colombian Civilians Fear Repression, Retribution, USA
TODAY, Oct. 25, 1999, at 17A.
12. Id.
13. Manglano, supra note 10, at 45.
14. Ruz Gutierrez, supra note 5; see also Esquirol, supra note 5, at 26-29.
15. Ruz Gutierrez, supra note 5 (explaining that from 1948-1966, it is estimated that
nearly 300,000 Colombians died as a result of partisan fighting, in a period known as La
Violencia, "The Violence").
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governmental weaknesses and com1plicity, and embraced violence as a means
to exert control over the country.! This violent heritage was also the basis,
for the current conflict between the government and guerrilla insurgents that
had its genesis more than thirty years ago. 17 By using violence to maintain
their respective power bases, the drug cartels, the guerrillas, and the
government have accelerated the downward spiral in human rights violations
that has now reached crisis proportions.18
The current conflict in Colombia is the culmination of decades of
violence. 19 Throughout the twentieth century, human rights violations have
been inflicted on the citizens of Colombia with increasing impunity, first by
the political status quo, later by the drug mafia, and finally by the guerrilla
forces and their nemeses--the paramilitary groups and the Colombian
military. 20 The human rights violators of today share a commonality of
purpose with their predecessors. Colombian history shows that political
factions-whether governmental, quasi-governmental,
insurgent or
criminal-maintain power through violence.21 In the current conflict,
violence is used to maintain the respective fiefdoms of the military, the drug
traffickers, the guerrilla forces, and the paramilitary groups, thus preventing
the government from effectively addressing either national concerns of
governance or the promotion of internationally recognized human rights.

mIX.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN COLOMBIA?

Responsibility for human rights violations in Colombia is shared by
guerrilla factions, paramilitary groups, drug traffickers, and government
forces.2 " All of these groups have committed atrocious human rights
violations to further their respective positions in the ongoing conflict.2

16.
17.
18.
19.

Ruz Gutierrez, supranote 5.
Brodzinsky, supra note 11.
Manglano, supranote 10, at 45.
Ruz Gutierrez, supra note 5.

20.

Id.

21.

Id. This explains how the causes of violence, poverty, social reform, and political

maneuvering have not changed throughout the 20th century, and that the guerrillas have

"sacrificed ideology to survive through capitalism.... ." Id.
22. 1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1; 1998 Colombia Country Report,

supra note 3.
23. Id.
Published by NSUWorks, 2001
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Under international human rights law, liability for abuses normally
extends only to state action.U Liability can be extended to private
individuals or groups only if they qualify as state agentsY This extension of
liability occurs if the violations of human rights law by private individuals or
groups are acquiesced in, tolerated, or condoned by the state. 26 International
human rights law is therefore arguably applicable to the guerrillas,
paramilitaries groups, and drug traffickers, as well as the military, because
the Colombian government, through its inability to effectively deal with the
violators, has acquiesced and tolerated their conduct.27 Even if some of the
human rights violators in the Colombian conflict are deemed to be private
individuals which human rights law therefore cannot reach, international
humanitarian law can fill the void and exact justice. It expressly binds all
parties to a conflict, including state security forces, dissident armed groups,
and all of their respective agents and proxies.2
A.

Government Forces

Throughout the 1990s, government forces have been responsible for a
substantial• 29.percentage of the human
rights violations that occur in
..
Colombia.
Most human rights violations inflicted by government forces
are perpetrated by the military and the national police. 30 Responsible parties
range from specifically identifiable military officials to entire units.3'
Ongoing abuses by police in urban areas, and by the army in rural areas, are
regularly reported by local human rights organizations. 32 Government
sponsored abuses often occur when the military fails to distinguish between
guerrillas and noncombatant citizens in its attempts to contain
counterinsurgency, resulting in massacre, disappearance, and torture of
innocent civilians.33 In addition, there is evidence that the Colombian
military collaborates with paramilitary groups in committing human rights
24. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia,
OEA/ser.L.V./II.102, doc. 9 rev. 1, at 71 (1999) [hereinafter IACHR Colombia Report].
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. IACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at 75, 96.
29. 1998 Colombia Country Report, supra note 3 (the army and police appear to be
jointly responsible for almost as many violations as the combined nongovernmental groups).
30. Manglano, supra note 10, at 47.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 47-48.
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abuses. 34 The national police and the Colombian military are also blamed
for maintaining a campaign of social cleansing within the country. 35 Human
rights violators within the Colombian military and police are rarely brought
to justice.36
B.

GuerrillaForces

There are several different guerrilla factions currently involved in the
armed conflict in Colombia. The principally recognized groups are the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia ("FARC"), the National
37
Liberation Army ("ELN"), and the People's Liberation Army ("EPL").

Of the three, FARC is the most influential and well-organized, and is
described as the oldest, most belligerent, and most powerful guerilla group in
the country. 38 FARC's ranks are estimated to total 10,000 to 15,000
soldiers.39 In an effort to induce the group to join peace talks, the
government ceded a 16,000-square-mile area in southwestern Colombia to
4
FARC in November 1998, which the rebels now completely control. 0
Approximately 100,000 Colombian citizens live in the ceded area. Since
gaining control, FARC has refused to allow international observers to

34. See 1998 Colombia Country Report, supra note 3; Human Rights in Colombia,
supra note 6 (there are troubling reports of persistent links between the army and paramilitary
groups).
35. Elizabeth F. Schwartz, GettingAway with Murder: Social Cleansing in Colombia
and the Role of the United States, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 381, 384 (1995-96)
(explaining that "[s]ocial cleansing ...consists of 'serial killings of people who have been
economically pushed so far toward the fringes of misery that the more affluent members of
society classify them as undesirable.' [As such, the] victims... are perceived... to be
dangerous and unfit to participate in society"); see also 1999 Colombia Country Reports,
supra note 1 (reporting that 279 such killings occurred during the first six months of 1999).
36. Schwartz, supra note 35, at 396; see also Colombia Convicts Former Army
General in Rights Case, USA TODAY, Feb. 14, 2001, at 13A (reporting that a former
Colombian general convicted for failing to defend a village during a killing spree by a right
wing death squad was "the first conviction of a Colombian general in a major human rights
case").
37. 1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1.
38. Pablo Rodriguez, Cada Vez Mas Distantes el Gobierno y Las FARC, EL NuEvo
HERALD (Miami), Sept. 21, 1999, at 6A.
39. Esquirol, supra note 5, at 29; see also Colombia, Rebels Will Talk Again, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 26, 1999, at 3A.
40. Brodzinsky, supra note 11.
41. See 1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1.
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oversee conditions in the zone. 42 It is estimated that with the addition of this
area ceded by the government, guerrilla forces now control approximately
forty percent of Colombian territory.43
Guerrilla forces are known to collect fees on narcotics production and
trafficking, which take place in the geographic areas they control, and the
funds collected are used to maintain their power base in the country."4 The
influence of these combined guerrilla forces is such that they have
effectively replaced the government in certain areas of the country. All of
the known guerrilla groups inflict a wide variety of human rights violations
on Colombian citizens with total impunity.4
C.

ParamilitaryGroups

As the government has ceded or lost control over large areas of the
national territory, the influence and power of paramilitary groups has
grown. 47 It is estimated that a paramilitary umbrella organization consisting
from 5000 to 7000 combatants now exists in Colombia. 48 The goal of this
organization is to extend its presence into areas of the country now under
guerrilla control. 49
This is accomplished by terrorizing guerrilla
sympathizers into fleeing their homes and, by so doing, depriving guerrillas
of civilian support. 50 In the process, civilians that are deemed to be
supporters of the guerrillas are murdered, tortured, and displaced. 51

42. Golden, supra note 7.
43. Colombia CallsforArmsfrom Uncle Sam, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 1999, at 17,
availableat 1999 WL 7364607.
44. Juan 0. Tamnayo, U.S. Officials Tie Colombian Guerrillas to Drug Exports,
MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 13, 2000, at 3A; see also 1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1
(estimating that these revenues run to the hundreds of millions of dollars); Andrew Selsky,
U.S.-Aided Drug War Starts Strong, SuN-SENTINEL (Broward), Feb. 4, 2001, at 21A (reporting
that FARC "earns huge profits by protecting coca crops and taxing the growers").
45. 1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1.
46. JACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at 96-112. See discussion in text infra
Section IV.
47. See 1998 Colombia Country Report,supra note 3.

48.

Id.

49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss2/9
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Evidence exists to suggest that the paramilitary groups have strong ties
Drug traffickers
to both drug traffickers and to the Colombian military.
employ paramilitaries as their own private armies. s The military uses them
to fight insurgents. 54 The influence of paramilitary groups is on the rise, and
the government is unable to bring them under control. 55
D.

Drug Traffickers

The ongoing role of drug cartels in the Colombian conflict and their
complicity in perpetrating human rights abuses should not be overlooked.
Although much of the reporting on human rights tends to ignore their
involvement, drug traffickers have long been associated with murders of
government officials, peace negotiators, educators, journalists, and other
civilians.5 6 While the high point of drug violence may have ended with the
demise of the more notorious kingpins, it still exists in a more decentralized
and underground form.57 Even if violations of human rights by drug
traffickers are not as overt as in the past, there is evidence that drug
trafficking is used to finance the operations of other participants in the
conflict, and that drug traffickers hire both the guerrilla and paramilitary
Regardless of the degree or nature of the
armies for protection. 5
cooperation, it is apparent that drug traffickers are complicit participants in
the conflict in Colombia and as such bear responsibility for the rampant
violations of human rights that occur there on a daily basis.
IV. WHAT HUMAN RIGHTs VIOLATIONS ARE PREVALENT IN
COLOMBIA TODAY?
The following section by no means provides an exhaustive overview of
human rights violations being perpetrated in Colombia todayunfortunately, there are many more. The specific abuses discussed below
were chosen to illustrate the types of abuses prevalent in Colombia today
52.

JACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at 131-32 (explaining that the

government "allowed the paramilitaries to act with legal protection and legitimacy in the
1970s and 1980s.... as a means of fighting the armed dissident groups").
53. 1998 Colombia Country Report, supra note 3.
54. Id.
55. 1999 Colombia Country Reports,supra note 1.
56. See generallyRuz Gutierrez, supra note 5.
57. Esquirol, supra note 5, at 35.
58. See 1998 Colombia CountryReport, supra note 3.
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that qualify as violations of both international human rights law and
international humanitarian law.59
A.

Disappearancesand Kidnappings

The prospect of forced disap0earances and kidnappings are threats that
Well over 3000 cases of forced
Colombian citizens face daily.
disappearances have been reported in Colombia since 1977. 6 ' The Center
for Investigations and Popular Research ("CINEP"), a nongovernmental
organization ("NGO") that tracks human rights abuses in Colombia, reports
that during the first nine months of 1998, paramilitary groups were
responsible for 126 known cases of forced disappearance.
There were
reports of 309 cases of forced disappearance during the first nine months of
1999.63 These figures are corroborated by a second NGO, the Permanent
Commission for the Defense of Human Rights ("CPDH"), which reported
that during the first six months of 1998, 117 people were forcibly
disappeared.6
CPDH reports indicate that most victims of forced
disappearance in Colombia are never heard from again. 65
While it is reported that forced disappearances are perpetrated almost
entirely by paramilitary groups, kidnapping is the forte of the guerrilla
factions and is described as an "unambiguous, standing policy and major
source of revenue for both FARC and ELN."
Colombia was ranked
number one in the world for kidnappings for ransom in 1999. 67 According to
59.

IACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24 (explaining that violations of

humanitarian law during internal armed conflicts such as the one taking place in Colombia
include, among other things, murder, forced disappearance, the taking of hostages, torture and
other cruel treatment, and displacement of civilian populations). The report explains, for
example, how summary execution qualifies as both a human rights violation and a violation of
international humanitarian law, in that "summary execution of a peasant farmer for alleged
cooperation with the guerrilla, which constitutes a violation of the right to life under human
rights law, will also involve a violation of the protections provided to civilians under
international humanitarian law, since the death was related to the armed conflict." Id. at 66.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1.
1998 Colombia Country Report, supra note 3.
Id.
1999 Colombia Country Reports, supranote 1.
1998 Colombia Country Report, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Julia Flynn, Global Kidnappings Climb to a New Peak, WALL ST. J.,
May 11,

2000, at A21.
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the NGO Pais Libre, there were 2216 kidnappings in Colombia in 1998, a
thirty-three percent increase over 1997.58 The 1999 estimate was 2945.69
The preferred victims of guerrilla kidnappers covered a wide spectrum of
citizens, including politicians, cattlemen, businessmen, and children, as well
as foreigners. 70 Less than half of these kidnapping victims were known to be
released
during the year, and arrests or prosecutions of the kidnappers were
71
rare.

B.

Torture and Related Treatment

In 1999, reports of torture and mistreatment of detainees by the national
police and the military continued. 72 Torture perpetrated by government
officials most often occurred in connection with the detention of
insurgents.7 3 In addition, CINEP reported that both paramilitary and
guerrilla groups were also responsible for torture, and that the bodies of
victims kidnapped and killed by guerrillas often showed signs of torture and
disfigurement. 74
In addition, prison conditions in Colombia are particularly harsh,
75
largely as a result of severe overcrowding and unsanitary health conditions.
An Inter-American Commission for Human Rights ("IACIR") mission that
visited a Bogota prison in December 1997 found conditions there amounted
76
to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment on the part of the government.
It also found that murder is prevalent inside prison walls.77

68. 1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1. According to the report, the NGO
Pals Libre attributed 667 cases to FARC, 566 to ELN, 109 to EPL, 43 to other guerrilla
groups, 20 to paramilitary groups, and 580 to other unknown organizations. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. Pais Libre reports that 189 children were kidnapped, up from 131 in 1998. Id.
71. 1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1.
72. Id.
73. Id.; see also IACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at 104-107. Armed
dissident groups were responsible for 15 percent of torture cases in 1996. Id. at 111. State
agents tortured, released, and displaced many persons in Colombia in 1995, and another
significant number were tortured before being executed. Id. at 104. Paramilitary groups

accounted for almost 75 percent of acts of torture in 1996. Id.
74. Id.
75.
76.

IACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24.
Id. at 104-107.

77.

Id.
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ExtrajudicialKilling

Colombia's murder rate is the highest in the world, and homicide is the
leading cause of death in the country.78 A large percentage of murders are
extrajudicial executions carried out by security forces or result from death in
combat due to the ongoing conflict. 79 Estimates of the number of
Colombians who died as a result of the armed conflict in 1998 range from
2000 to 6000.80 The Colombian military, paramilitary groups, guerrilla
factions, and drug traffickers have all been implicated as using extrajudicial
killings to further their respective goals in the ongoing conflict in
Colombia.81
D.

Displacement

The internal displacement of thousands of Colombian citizens has been
described as a "longstanding and underreported problem" that is a direct
result of the ongoing conflict.82 It is estimated that during 1998, 300,000
Colombians were displaced as a result of ongoing paramilitary and guerrilla
attacks.8 3 Prior to 1998, Colombia's internal refugee population was4
estimated to be one million, placing it among the top four in the world.8
Most displaced Colombians remain within the country, but many seek
international refuge, clearly placing this effect of the Colombian conflict in
an international context. 85

78.
79.
80.

Schwartz, supra note 35, at 382.
Id. at 383.
Colombia Unida Por La Paz, EL NUEVO HERALD (Miami), Oct. 25, 1999, at IA.

81.

See generally 1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1.

82. Margalit Edelman, Colombia's Quiet Catastrophe,CHRISTAN SCL. MoNrroR, June
22, 1999, at 11.

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. In a notable example, some 2600 refugees who sought refuge in Venezuela
were eventually repatriated to Colombia in an apparent violation of Venezuela's obligations
under international law. Id. An examination of this aspect of the Colombian crisis, however,
does not fall within the framework of this paper. It serves as an example, however, of the
international community's unwillingness to acknowledge the scope of Colombia's internal
turmoil and its human rights repercussions.
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WHAT IS COLOMBIA'S OFFICIAL POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS?

Colombia "Talks the Talk"

Colombia's record of espousing support for human rights within both
domestic and international legal frameworks is exemplary. The Colombian

Constitution of 1991 incorporates human rights provisions and specifically
provides for citizen's rights. Such rights include: due process, freedom
from torture, and right to life to be protected from violation. Article 93 of
the constitution places treaties that deal with international human rights and

humanitarian
law in preeminent positions with respect to the domestic legal
7
systeM.8
On the international side, Colombia has ratified most major
international human rights covenants, protocols, and conventions, including
the Convention Against Torture. 88 Colombia has signed and ratified the
American Convention on Human Rights ("American Convention"), and has
accepted the competency of the Inter-American Court for Human Rights

("Inter-American Court").8 9 In accepting the competency of the Court,
however, Colombia reserved the right to withdraw its acceptance at any
moment that it considers to be opportune. 9°

86.
87.

Manglano, supranote 10, at 46.
Id.

88. UNIT=D NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHrs, United Nations
Human Rights Website, Treaty Bodies Database, Status by Country, available at
http:lluntreaty.un.org. Colombia is a signatory of the following: Convention Against Torture;
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; Convention
on the Rights of the Child (with reservations); International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Optional and Second
Optional Protocols to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the International
Convention on Protection and Rights of All Migrant Workers. Id.
89. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Convention Signatories, available at http:llwww.corteidhoea.nu.cr/ci/ (last visited Oct 2, 1999). Colombia was the second country to ratify the
American Convention on Human Rights on July 31, 1973, and accepted the competency of the
Court on June 21, 1985. Id.
90. Id.
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Colombia Doesn't "Walk the Walk"

Colombia's record of enforcing human rights within its borders,
however, is dismal and is characterized as the worst in the world.91 Human
rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law perpetrated
92
by the participants in the current conflict go almost totally unpunished.
Although both the Colombian Penal Code and the Colombian Constitution
provide support for punishing human rights violators in the domestic system
by explicitly prohibiting such human rights abuses as extrajudicial killings,
torture, and kidnapping, the Colombian government has shown
93 that it is
basis.
this
on
justice
to
perpetrators
bring
to
unable or unwilling
Some view the Colombian Constitution as a laudable effort by
Colombia to show the world that it recognizes that human rights violations
are prevalent in the country, but it has so far been ineffective, particularly
against one of the principal violators of human rights in the country: its own
military.9 4 By channeling human rights abuse cases against members of the
military to military tribunals, the constitution virtually guarantees that such
offenders will be judged only by military peers, if they are prosecuted at
all.95 While recent reports indicate some willingness on the part of the
government to prosecute a small number of military officials for human
rights violations, the number is limited compared with the scope of the
violations for which the military is responsible.
Although domestic law provides a legal basis to pursue other offenders,
the fact that the government cedes control of up to forty percent of the
national territory to guerrilla groups and allows drug traffickers to operate
with near total impunity suggests that any power to bring these groups to
justice on human rights grounds is extremely limited. As previously
discussed, this problem is further complicated by a generally
ineffective
7
judiciary that is unable to successfully prosecute crimes.
It is, therefore, logical to conclude that such a domestic system is
particularly unprepared to prosecute human rights violations when common
91. Manglano, supra note 10, at 45.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 47.
95. Id.
96. See 1998 Colombia Country Report, supra note 3; see also Colombia Convicts
FormerArmy General in Rights Case, supra note 36.
97. Manglano, supra note 10, at 50.
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criminals generally go free. In fact, reports indicate that where human rights
abuses are concerned, impunity reaches 100 percent. 98 Whether by choice or
through powerlessness, it is clear that Colombia doesn't "walk the walk" that
is required to implement the effective prosecution and punishment of human
rights violations that its domestic laws and international treaty obligations
demand.
VI. WHAT ARE THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
CURRENT CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA?

A

Colombia'sInternationalHuman Rights Treaty Obligations: No Teeth

As indicated above, Colombia is a signatory of most of the major
international human rights treaties, conventions, and protocols. 99 None of
these obligations provide a means by which perpetrators of human rights
violations in the current conflict in Colombia can be prosecuted or punished.
B.

The Inter-American System: It Falls Short

Colombia's adherence to the American Convention and its acceptance
of the binding jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court offer a limited means
to address human rights violations. The Inter-American Court hears cases
brought by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights against
consenting member states for violations perpetrated by the state itself, or
against private individuals or groups acting with the acquiescence of the
state.1° As a result, individual claims could conceivably be brought under
this system.
It is important to note, however, that the Inter-American system was
designed to treat cases involving the type of gross human rights violations
that occur in Colombia today through its in loco reporting system, rather
than by bringing individual claims before the Inter-American Court.10 1 In
fact, the individual claims mechanism was conceived as a precautionary
measure with a preventive role whereby "a single violation could be the first
indication of the beginning of a process that, if allowed to proceed, will
result in regression back to an authoritarian structure," seemingly before a
98. ZACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at 75.
99. Manglano, supra note 10, at 52.
100. IACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at71.
101. Claudio Grossman, Strengtheningthe Inter-American Human Rights System: The
Current Debate,92 AM. SOC'Y INT'LL. PROc. 186, 187-88 (1998).
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situation reached the gross and flagrant stage. 10 2 Such is clearly not the case
in Colombia. While it is certainly conceivable that an individual claim could
be brought before the Inter-American Court to address human rights abuses
in the current conflict, where abuses number in the thousands, indicative of a
claims
breakdown of rule of law of enormous proportions, the individual
103
overloaded.
be
would
system
Inter-American
the
of
mechanism
The result of applying the in loco reporting procedures in the case of
Colombia would be the preparation of a report by the IACHR suggesting
actions to be undertaken by the Colombian government to stem the tide of
abuses. 104 In the case of controlling human rights violations by the military,
the IACHR report addresses the issue of the autonomy of the military courts,
but it does not provide a means to punish any perpetrators of human rights
violations who currently operate in Colombia with impunity. 10 5 The in loco
system suggests a solution tied to a domestic judicial remedy. To be
effective, such a solution requires that the country involved have control of
its political system. In a country like Colombia where impunity reigns and
justice is ineffective, such a solution is of limited consequence in effectively
dealing with the human rights abuses that are being inflicted by a range of
both state and non-state actors, which the government is unable or unwilling
to control.
In fact, the IACHR recently released a report on Colombia following a
visit in that country that provides the Inter-American system response to the
conflict.1° 6 The report acknowledges the existence of violations of both
human rights law and international humanitarian law in Colombia, but its
relatively toothless recommendations seem unrealistic and inadequate in
view of the seriousness and urgency of the situation. 10 7
As the foregoing analysis indicates, the Colombian government has
become increasingly ineffective in dealing with the problems of conflict and
violence that have arisen within its borders over the last three decades. The
IACHR report, however, calls for action by this inactive government to

102. Id. at 188.

103. Id. (explaining that "the impact of the 'case approach' in situations of mass and
gross violations is more limited than the impact of visits in loco" because trying to use the
case system to address thousands of violations is like "the fable of the Dutch boy who tries to
stop a flood by putting his finger in a hole in a dike as the whole structure collapses"). Id.

104. See id.
105. See Manglano, supra note 10, at 51.
106 IACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at 70.

107. Id. at 71.
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resolve a situation it seems powerless to control.108 The report exhorts the
government to resolve the conflict based on a series of recommendations,
which include, among other things: 1) intensification of human rights
training of security forces; 2) dissemination of human rights information to
the violators and the general population; 3) immediate implementation of
measures to insure effective criminal investigation of human rights
abuses; and 4) immediate implementation of measures to dismantle
paramilitary groups 3 9 The report also calls on all parties "[to] respect,
implement and enforce the rules governing hostilities set forth in
international humanitarian law, with particular emphasis on the protection of
civilians."" It offers no insight, however, into how this resolution is to be
accomplished by a government that is at best powerless or at worst
complicit, and how parties that disregard basic humanitarian concerns will
all at once pay heed to this call.
The report exposes the deficiencies of the Inter-American system in
dealing with the type of situation that exists in Colombia today, where the
government is but one of several culprits participating in gross violations of
human rights. The Inter-American system was designed in large part to
respond to the abuses of dictatorships through individualized complaints that
would lead to reports by the IACHR that provided authoritative accounts of
the violations.' The current situation in Colombia does not fit the model. It
calls for a type of redress that the Inter-American system cannot provide,
either in terms of prosecution or punishment.
Moreover, whether a solution based on human rights law can even
reach such non-state actors as the drug traffickers and the guerrilla groups is
an open question, since it can be argued that the Colombian government
attempts to control them, albeit ineffectively, and therefore has not
acquiesced, accepted, or condoned their conduct.'

108. Id. at 70-71.
109. Id.

110. Id.
111. Grossman, supranote 101, at 189-90.
112. The same may not be true for the paramilitary groups, since there is evidence of
acquiescence in the form of collusion between this group and government forces. It can also
conceivably be argued that the guerrilla groups are state actors themselves by virtue of the fact
that they control large portions of Colombian territory.
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InternationalHumanitarianLaw: Can Recent PrecedentStick?

Even if its recommendations fall short, the IACHR report offers a
detailed analysis of how international humanitarian law applies to the
idiosyncrasies of the ongoing conflict in Colombia.' 13 Several of the
observations and conclusions reached by the IACHR indicate that
international humanitarian law may provide the means to hold the
and drug
Colombian government, the guerrillas, the paramilitary groups, 114
traffickers liable for human rights violations, and even punish them.
The IACHR report openly admits that the American Convention and
other universal and regional human rights instruments cannot be used to
regulate to any great degree human rights abuses that occur during internal
conflicts like the one that is now underway in Colombia.11 5 It does,
humanitarian law is specifically
however, point out that international
6
designed to restrain such conduct.'
By invoking recent international humanitarian legal precedent, the
IACHR issues a warning to the offending parties in the conflict. It puts them
on notice that such recent international legal developments as the formation
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the
possible impending establishment of an international criminal court indicate
an international remedy that will stick to
that there is growing precedent for
1 17
offenders like those in Colombia
As the IACHR report points out, the application of humanitarian law to
the conflict in Colombia is particularly appropriate for two reasons." 8 First,
Colombia has acknowledged that its internal conflict rises to the level
required for international humanitarian law to apply.1 19 Second, Colombia
has acknowledged the applicability of the Geneva Conventions, which its
constitution 2has established as preeminent law within its own domestic
framework. 0
The IACHR report specifically concludes that international
humanitarian law norms apply equally to human rights violations committed
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

IACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at 94-96.
Id. at78.
Id. at 74.
Id.
Id. at 156-58.
IACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at 71-72.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 78.
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in Colombia by guerrillas, the government, and paramilitary groups, because
parties to such a conflict "are directly bound by international humanitarian
law, and their belligerent acts are appropriately evaluated by reference to
those norms. '121 As a result, the report analyzes the activities of each of
these groups in light of applicable international humanitarian law and
reiterates a conclusion reached after a 1997 on-site visit to Colombia where
it noted that violations of human rights and/or international humanitarian law
"could constitute crimes of an international character which would incur the
individual criminal responsibility of the authors, who may be prosecuted in
any State in which they happen to be [found]. 12 2
Fortunately for the violators, and unfortunately for the citizens of
Colombia, the current state of international humanitarian law most likely
means that at most the perpetrators of human rights violence in Colombia
will receive the type of warning contained in the IACHR report. The
proposed International Criminal Court might offer a solution that applies to
the conflict in Colombia because it promises to investigate and bring justice
to individuals who commit the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community, such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity.123 However, this solution is far from an immediate one. Even
though twenty-seven countries, including the United States, ratified the
treaty, sixty must do so before the court is established. 124 However, in the
case of the United States, the treaty is not binding without Senate approval,
and there is strong opposition to such approval.'2
The situation in Colombia cannot wait for the International Criminal
Court to be established. Thus, other suggested solutions will not do justice.
The IACHR report's suggested solution relies too heavily on the weakened,
beleaguered Colombian government to make a complete about face and
bring the perpetrators to justice. 126 Other suggested courses of action
overlook the fact that there are multiple offenders of human rights in the
current conflict. This calls for prosecution of the military alone for failing to
address the full magnitude of the violations. 127 - Some suggest that
121. Id. at 96.
122. Id. at 156.
123. IACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at 72.
124. Joan Smith, Comment & Analysis: Hypocrite to the Last: The U.S. President has
Suddenly Signed up to the Planfor an International War Crimes Tribunal, THE GUARDIAN,
Jan. 3, 2001, availableat 2000 WL 2910289.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Manglano, supranote 10, at 51.
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prosecution is not needed at all, and that the guerrillas should be excused
because the basis of their insurgency is a struggle for equality, overlooking
the suffering that Colombian citizens have endured for decades."2 Still
others espouse a negotiated settlement, ignoring the fact that such a
settlement in the end signifies one more round of impunity for human rights
violators in Colombia.129 And the government views the solution in dollar
terms, and seeks help in the form of financial and military aid, with the
United States ready, willing, and able to provide money.
None of these approaches have worked in the past and there is little
reason to believe they will work now. All overlook the depth of the chaos,
its ongoing nature, and the extent of the violations. Drastic measures are
required
to resolve this quiet catastrophe that worsens with the passage of
1 31
time.
The Colombian government is unable or unwilling to bring human
rights violators to justice. International human rights law offers little chance
International
of prosecuting and punishing human rights violators.
humanitarian law may offer hope for the thousands of Colombians abused by
this conflict, which challenges established human rights law mechanisms
such as the Inter-American system. The level of violence and the fact that
blame can be laid at so many doors makes it impossible for the government
to effectively act.
It is time for the international community to recognize that the armed
conflict in Colombia has risen to the level that justifies invoking established
international humanitarian legal precedent. As in the case of atrocities in
other parts of the world, a Colombian war crimes tribunal should be
established to bring violators from all sides in the current conflict to justice.
Without international intervention of this type, there is little hope that the
Colombian government will be able to regain control of the national territory
while ending decades of human rights abuses inflicted upon the citizens of
Colombia. Without justice for Colombia, there will be no peace.

128. Nick Trebat, Drugs Replace Communism as the Point of Entryfor U.S. Policy on
1999), at
Latin America, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (Aug. 24,
http://www.icde.com/-paulwolf/hemisphr.htm.
129. Winifred Tate, Increased U.S. Military Aid to Colombia Won't Curb Drug
at
25,
at
Aug.
19,
1999,
CHRONICLE,
Trafficking,
SAN
FRANCISCO
http://www.lightparty.com/WarOnDrugs/DrugTrafficking6.html.
130. See Christopher Marquis, Un "Plan Marshall" Para Colombia, EL NUEVO
HERALD (Miami), Sept. 21, 1999, at IA.
131. See Edelman, supra note 82.
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VII. CONCLUSION,

The foregoing analysis shows that Colombia has failed to protect its
citizens from human rights violations perpetrated by its own military, by
guerrilla groups, by paramilitary groups functioning either independently of
or in complicity with the government, and by drug traffickers. The
international and regional human rights treaties, conventions, and protocols
to which Colombia has submitted are inadequate to address the problem of
punishing human rights violators. Since the international criminal court is
not yet operational, an international criminal tribunal should be formed to
address the fact that: Colombia is unable to punish violators through its own
domestic laws due to the severity of the internal conflict and the
government's ineffectiveness; and international human rights law is geared
toward promoting human rights rather than enforcing them and is designed
to address the government as violator, an idiosyncracy that makes its
application to the current conflict in Colombia particularly ineffective.
Alan Seagrave
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